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Abstract: Rural areas face increasing pressures to deliver both private 
and public goods from land management. Multiple stakeholders seek 
different outcomes; and there is substantial heterogeneity in values. 
Trade-offs, synergies and complementarities exist between different 
services and alternative bundles of goods. The resulting complex social- 
ecological systems (SES) therefore require adaptive co-management. In a 
governance context, no single organisation has oversight across the 
variety of interests involved, but the challenge remains as to how these 
interests can best be balanced and negotiated, to deliver socially 
beneficial outcomes. This paper analyses how this might be achieved by 
considering the perspective of a 'social residual claimant' (SRC). The 
SRC, as an ideal type, represents the ultimate 'owner' or steward of an 
ecosystem which sets the criteria to assess alternative outcomes, 
identifying best approaches and promoting resilience through adaptive 
management. A SRC cannot be a static construct, but must interact with 
and influence private land-holders and other stakeholders, adjusting 
actions as circumstances change. We identify the criteria that would be 
required in order for an SRC to act in the best interests of society. We 
then make a comparison of these criteria against the conditions applying 
in three contrasting approaches currently operating in the UK: National 
Parks Landscape Partnerships and Nature Improvement Areas. This 
enables us to identify the differences between approaches and to suggest 
changes that could enhance capabilities, as well as ideas for further 
research. We suggest that the ideal of an SRC offers a simple method of 
benchmarking that has potential application across a wider range of 
different local contexts, beyond the UK. 
 
Response to Reviewers: Reviewer #1 
1. … Thus, my major suggestion would be to clarify what they mean. And I 
think what they mean with the SRC is likely quite close to the idea of a 
bridging organization (or network administrative organizations, a policy 
platform, boundary organization, etc). Thus, either stick to one (or 
several) of these more established concepts, or more clearly explain how 
the SRC relate to these (and what makes it different). 
 
Response: 
We have substantially reworked the paper in order to explain more clearly 
the position of the SRC and why it is different from these other types of 
organisation. 
 
2. The really interesting research questions, as I see 
it, it to try to figure out if and how governance, as an inclusive 
approach to government, can succeed it that. To move beyond simple 
assertions of the value of governance to more critically examine how to 
make governance arrangement effective. That research agenda includes 
focusing on different ‘venues’ for co‐management (or collaborations) – 
such as the studied three cases in this paper. Thus, I find the 
assessment of the seven criteria for these organization useful and 
interesting (although, again, I would not expect that any one actor would 
and should fulfill all of them). And worth publishing. But again, the 
focus on the SRC distracts the reader from the value of this exercise. 
 
 
Response: 
We see the shift from government to governance as a key driver for our 
analysis. The proliferation of governance mechanisms means that no 
single organisation has oversight. This emphasises the need for the SRC 
role. 
The SRC is not taking on the full role of governance, but rather 
responding to the outcomes of other governance mechanisms and setting an 
ideal against which to identify gaps potentially left by the variety of 
existing actors and organisations that emerge in the process of 
governance. 
 
3. So what I suggest is a major reconstruction of the paper, where the 
concept of SRC might even have to be discarded – unless it can be much 
better explained and justified. 
 
Response: 
We have substantially rewritten the paper to explain and justify our 
approach to the SRC. 
 
 
Reviewer #2 Responses 
1. The article is well written, although seems lengthy at times. This 
manuscript has the potential to contribute to an existing (and growing) 
body of literature on institutional aspects of social-ecological system 
(SES) governance, specifically through the direct comparison of different 
approaches to ecosystem (SES) governance in England. 
 
No response. 
 
2. Beyond this contribution of location-specific examples and comparison, 
I found it difficult to clearly decipher the broader implications of this 
manuscript, as well as how this research will appeal to the global 
readership of Environmental Science & Policy. 
Two reasons brought me to this point: 
1) many of the conclusions the authors reach are findings common to (and 
do not significantly advance) the rather robust literature on adaptive 
governance, adaptive co-management and collaborative (environmental) 
management broadly, and 
 
Response: 
We argue that the idea of an SRC offers a systematic methodology for 
assessing governance structures that can have much wider application. We 
are illustrating this through the English case studies but see the main 
contribution as methodological. We believe that the introduction of the 
idea of the social residual claimant is a novel contribution. We have 
tried to emphasise and justify this in the revision. 
 
3. 2) the conclusions are relative to the developed, highly- 
institutionalised context of an advanced nation such as England. This 
second point is not an insurmountable concern; I urge the authors to 
briefly discuss the applicability of their findings beyond the context in 
which voluntary and funded collaboration for environmental decision 
making is a viable alternative. 
 
Response: 
We have emphasised the point of the SRC as a methodological approach that 
has wider relevance. We have added conclusions that make this wider 
point. 
 
4. Further, I wish the authors would make their overall contribution and 
implications of this research more apparent in the conclusion and perhaps 
in the abstract and introduction as well. As it stands, the advancement 
of theory on the governance of complex SESs is unclear 
 
Response: 
This has now been explained in the introduction and conclusions and in 
the abstract. 
 
5. Structurally, I first suggest that the authors remove Table 2. Whereas 
the focus of the analysis in this manuscript is on the scale/scope of an 
SES, this table and background focused on 'rural' governance more 
generally seems unnecessary and distracting. 
 
Response: 
Yes. Table 2 has been removed. 
 
6. Instead, spend more time discussing why NPAs, LPs and NIAs were chosen 
above these more sectorial organisations to analyse in the context of 
SRCs. 
 
Response: 
We have added discussion on this point. 
 
7. In addition, under your analysis of "Criterion 1" starting on page 11 
line 21, the bulk of the information here is just describing what each of 
these initiatives/organisations are and how they operate. This 
information could be much more easily conveyed in a table, and I think 
this table could be a good substitute for the current Table 2. Such a 
table could include a brief background for each organisation (NPA, LP, 
NIA) with columns such as "history, mission, purpose, level of 
integration" etc. I see two benefits from such a table: 1) provides the 
reader with a quick reference context to refer to as you continue to 
analyse these organisations in terms of your 7 Critera; and 2) frees up 
text space for you to discuss Criterion 1 more substantively 
(specifically the range of ecosystem services valued in each NPA, LP, 
NIA), currently a weakness of this section. 
 
Response: 
We have added a table that summarises some of this information and edited 
the section in light of this. 
We have added discussion with regard to Criterion 1. 
 
8. I also suggest that the authors shorten the manuscript. There seem to 
be a handful of paragraphs that monopolise space to explain concepts 
tangentially related to understanding the role of the SRC concept in 
critiquing SES governance arrangements both theoretically and in the 
English example. Specifically, consider removing or substantially 
shortening the following lines: page 4 line 60 through page 5 line 6; 
page 8 lines 27-31; page 9 lines 24-42; and page 18 lines 38-43. 
 
Response: 
We have edited out text in the sections referred to. We have also cut out 
Table 1 and other material that is less central to our argument. 
 
9. In general, I find the SRC framing to be problematic. I do not suggest 
that my contention with the SRC concept inhibits the publishability of 
this manuscript, but I do feel that it merits a brief discussion here. 
The way the SRC is presented in this manuscript assumes that there can 
(and should?) exist an ideal group, entity or organisation ("claimant") 
that, in the authors words, "owns" an ecosystem at a particular scale. 
The concept also assumes that this "claimant" will advocate on behalf of 
the beneficiaries of ecosystem service at the particular SESs scale in 
question (focal scale). How is it possible to ignore the political 
unlikelihood of such an assumption? How does the claimant construct a 
'collective will' from which to advocate? How are marginalised 
beneficiaries represented at these scales? Is the ideal-type of an SRC 
truly inclusive and consensus-driven? If so, is it still helpful to 
measure potential success against what is likely to be a political 
infeasible ideal? Does this concept take into account what is likely to 
be the nested nature, overlap and redundancy of claimants depending on 
focal scale of SES conflicts? How does the SRC concept differ from, 
compliment or contradict the literature on adaptive governance which 
includes the emergence of organisations of co-management, the application 
of adaptive management, but also takes into account the role of markets, 
hierarchies, established institutions (including formal laws and informal 
rules and social norms) and political realities (Folke et al. 2005; 
Olsson et al. 2006; Chaffin et al. 2014; Schultz et al. 2015)? 
 
Response: 
This is a key issue and we have rewritten the text to clarify and explain 
the SRC as an ‘ideal type’ rather than a practical organisation to be 
established. We have included new material and substantially rewritten 
the text to clarify and sharpen our arguments about the nature and 
relevance of the SRC. 
 
Our aim is not to prescribe how an SRC would operate in practice (eg how 
to determine a collective will or represent maginalised beneficiaries), 
or to prescribe any particular approach to governance, (such as to manage 
for resilience). Rather the method seeks to offer the criteria for 
assessing the extent to which governance structures in practice meet our 
ideal. 
 
We have revised the text to clarify this and avoid the impression given 
that we wish to prescribe the particular approaches that an SRC should 
take. 
 
10. "Promoting resilience" (abstract line 34, page 5 line 35, etc.) 
supports a normative reading of the concept of "resilience." While there 
is a multiplicity of interpretations of this problematic term (Brand and 
Jax 2008), resilience in the context of SESs is a non-normative property 
(Gunderson and Holling 2002); resilience is a description of the degree 
to which a system can withstand disturbance (both internal and external) 
and maintain a system of stabilising feedbacks. In terms of governance, 
an oppressive dictatorship can be resilient, as can a system of SES 
governance that promotes unbridled resource extraction, and 
marginalisation of a social wellbeing as long as the resource base and 
power structures will allow. Obviously such a trajectory is not 
sustainable, but it may be extremely resilient and require substantial 
disturbance to force regime shift. Given this context, I find that 
"promoting resilience" as a goal in and of itself, is difficult to 
swallow. 
 
Response: 
As noted above, it was not our intention to promote a ‘resilience’ 
approach in this paper. Rather the approach to be adopted should be 
determined through the SRC process. We have reworded the text to reflect 
this approach. 
 
11. List of "ecosystem" governance challenges on page 3: why are these 
not SES governance challenges? These all seem to have socio-economic and 
political aspects as important as the biophysical uncertainty surrounding 
them. 
 
Response: 
Yes, this has been amended. 
 
12. Page 4, transition between Part 3 and Part 4 of manuscript: a 
transitioning sentence or paragraph between the theoretical discussion of 
the SRC and the "cases" you explore in England (NPA, LP, NIA) would help 
the readability here. 
 
Response: 
We have added a linking sentence at the start of Section 4. 
 
 
13. In addition, how did you justify choosing the three 
initiatives/organisations you chose to compare? What were your methods 
for analysing these examples? Without knowing how these examples were 
selected and the methods and breadth of information used to analyse them, 
the robustness of your conclusions cannot be assessed. Please address 
 
Response: 
We have added discussion on this point. 
 
14. Page 13, lines 27-30: you discuss "authority and capacity" here, what 
about legitimacy? 
Response: 
Our summary list of criteria inevitably cannot discuss all of the 
relevant issues. For example, the SRC would need to take a broad view 
(Criterion 1) in order to have legitimacy. We would then assume that 
legitimacy would be a necessary precursor to authority and have not 
included this explicitly. 
 
15. Table 3: why not compare all three examples here (NPA, LP, NIA), why 
just NPA? However, I recognise the authors state that NPAs have the most 
advanced governance roles/responsibilities, it still may be a relevant 
comparison for the manuscript as a whole. 
 
Response: 
A table of this sort for the other 2 cases would have a large number of 
empty boxes given the narrower focus of the LPs and NIAs. 
 
16. Page 16, line 20: Again, this statement makes my question above 
related to your methods much more critical to address. 
 
Response: 
We recognise this limit of the approach taken here. 
 
17. Page 20, line 12: "funding... guaranteed for a minimum of, say, five 
or six years"—based on what evidence? Why not 10-12 years? This seems 
like an arbitrary suggestion. 
 
Response: 
This reflects our experience with the analysis of partnerships in the UK 
but of course there is no clear number. The 5 or 6 years is to emphasise 
something beyond the usual shorter terms while avoiding any open-ended 
commitment. The wording has been revised. 
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Dear Dr Beniston 
 
Thank you for your responses to our paper: ͚Governance structures for social-ecological 
systems: institutional directions in the United Kingdoŵ͛ submitted to Environmental Science 
and Policy. 
 
The Reviewers͛ comments have prompted us to substantially re-write large sections of the 
paper in order sharpen our ideas and clarify our presentation, to justify our approach and to 
explain why we believe that the approach has more general relevance. We have also cut 
out a significant volume of less critical material. 
 
I hope that this will have met your Reviewers͛ concerns. 
Yours sincerely 
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*Response to Reviewers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reviewer #1 Responses 
  
… Thus, my major suggestion would be to clarify what 
they mean. And I think what they mean with the SRC is 
likely quite close to the idea of a bridging organization (or 
network administrative organizations, a policy platform, 
boundary organization, etc). Thus, either stick to one (or 
several) of these more established concepts, or more 
clearly explain how the SRC relate to these (and what 
makes it different). 
We have substantially reworked the 
paper in order to explain more clearly 
the position of the SRC and why it is 
different from these other types of 
organisation. 
The really interesting research questions, as I see 
it, it to try to figure out if and how governance, as an 
inclusive approach to government, can succeed it that. To 
move beyond simple assertions of the value of governance 
to more critically examine how to make governance 
arrangement effective. That research agenda includes 
focusing on different ͚venues͛ for co‐management (or 
collaborations) – such as the studied three cases in this 
paper. Thus, I find the assessment of the seven criteria for 
these organization useful and interesting (although, again, 
I would not expect that any one actor would and should 
fulfill all of them). And worth publishing. But again, the 
focus on the SRC distracts the reader from the value of this 
exercise. 
We see the shift from government to 
governance as a key driver for our 
analysis. The proliferation of 
governance mechanisms means that 
no single organisation has oversight. 
This emphasises the need for the SRC 
role. 
The SRC is not taking on the full role of 
governance, but rather responding to 
the outcomes of other governance 
mechanisms and setting an ideal 
against which to identify gaps 
potentially left by the variety of 
existing actors and organisations that 
emerge in the process of governance. 
So what I suggest is a major reconstruction of the paper, 
where the concept of SRC might even have to be discarded 
– unless it can be much better explained and justified. 
We have substantially rewritten the 
paper to explain and justify our 
approach to the SRC. 
  
  
Reviewer #2 Responses 
The article is well written, although seems lengthy at 
times. This manuscript has the potential to contribute to 
an existing (and growing) body of literature on institutional 
aspects of social-ecological system (SES) governance, 
specifically through the direct comparison of different 
approaches to ecosystem (SES) governance in England. 
 
Beyond this contribution of location-specific examples and 
comparison, I found it difficult to clearly decipher the 
broader implications of this manuscript, as well as how 
this research will appeal to the global readership of 
Environmental Science & Policy. 
Two reasons brought me to this point: 
1) many of the conclusions the authors reach are findings 
common to (and do not significantly advance) the rather 
robust literature on adaptive governance, adaptive co- 
management and collaborative (environmental) 
management broadly, and 
We argue that the idea of an SRC offers 
a systematic methodology for 
assessing governance structures that 
can have much wider application. We 
are illustrating this through the English 
case studies but see the main 
contribution as methodological. We 
believe that the introduction of the 
idea of the social residual claimant is a 
novel contribution.   We have tried to 
emphasise and justify this in the 
revision. 
2) the conclusions are relative to the developed, highly- 
institutionalised context of an advanced nation such as 
 
We have emphasised the point of the 
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England. This second point is not an insurmountable 
concern; I urge the authors to briefly discuss the 
applicability of their findings beyond the context in which 
voluntary and funded collaboration for environmental 
decision making is a viable alternative. 
SRC as a methodological approach that 
has wider relevance.  We have added 
conclusions that make this wider point. 
Further, I wish the authors would make their overall 
contribution and implications of this research more 
apparent in the conclusion and perhaps in the abstract and 
introduction as well. As it stands, the advancement of 
theory on the governance of complex SESs is unclear 
 
This has now been explained in the 
introduction and conclusions and in 
the abstract. 
Structurally, I first suggest that the authors remove Table 
2. Whereas the focus of the analysis in this manuscript is 
on the scale/scope of an SES, this table and background 
focused on 'rural' governance more generally seems 
unnecessary and distracting. 
 
Yes. Table 2 has been removed. 
Instead, spend more time discussing why NPAs, LPs and 
NIAs were chosen above these more sectorial 
organisations to analyse in the context of SRCs. 
 
We have added discussion on this 
point. 
In addition, under your analysis of "Criterion 1" starting on 
page 11 line 21, the bulk of the information here is just 
describing what each of these initiatives/organisations are 
and how they operate. This information could be much 
more easily conveyed in a table, and I think this table 
could be a good substitute for the current Table 2. Such a 
table could include a brief background for each 
organisation (NPA, LP, NIA) with columns such as "history, 
mission, purpose, level of integration" etc. I see two 
benefits from such a table: 1) provides the reader with a 
quick reference context to refer to as you continue to 
analyse these organisations in terms of your 7 Critera; and 
2) frees up text space for you to discuss Criterion 1 more 
substantively (specifically the range of ecosystem services 
valued in each NPA, LP, NIA), currently a weakness of this 
section. 
 
We have added a table that 
summarises some of this information 
and edited the section in light of this. 
 
We have added discussion with regard 
to Criterion 1. 
I also suggest that the authors shorten the manuscript. 
There seem to be a handful of paragraphs that monopolise 
space to explain concepts tangentially related to 
understanding the role of the SRC concept in critiquing SES 
governance arrangements both theoretically and in the 
English example. Specifically, consider removing or 
substantially shortening the following lines: page 4 line 60 
through page 5 line 6; page 8 lines 27-31; page 9 lines 24- 
42; and page 18 lines 38-43. 
 
We have edited out text in the sections 
referred to. We have also cut out Table 
1 and other material that is less central 
to our argument. 
In general, I find the SRC framing to be problematic. I do 
not suggest that my contention with the SRC concept 
inhibits the publishability of this manuscript, but I do feel 
that it merits a brief discussion here. The way the SRC is 
presented in this manuscript assumes that there can (and 
should?) exist an ideal group, entity or organisation 
 
This is a key issue and we have 
rewritten the text to clarify and explain 
the SRC as aŶ ͚ideal type͛ rather than a 
practical organisation to be 
established. We have included new 
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("claimant") that, in the authors words, "owns" an 
ecosystem at a particular scale. The concept also assumes 
that this "claimant" will advocate on behalf of the 
beneficiaries of ecosystem service at the particular SESs 
scale in question (focal scale). How is it possible to ignore 
the political unlikelihood of such an assumption? How  
does the claimant construct a 'collective will' from which  
to advocate? How are marginalised beneficiaries 
represented at these scales? Is the ideal-type of an SRC 
truly inclusive and consensus-driven? If so, is it still helpful 
to measure potential success against what is likely to be a 
political infeasible ideal? Does this concept take into 
account what is likely to be the nested nature, overlap and 
redundancy of claimants depending on focal scale of SES 
conflicts? How does the SRC concept differ from, 
compliment or contradict the literature on adaptive 
governance which includes the emergence of  
organisations of co-management, the application of 
adaptive management, but also takes into account the role 
of markets, hierarchies, established institutions (including 
formal laws and informal rules and social norms) and 
political realities (Folke et al. 2005; Olsson et al. 2006; 
Chaffin et al. 2014; Schultz et al. 2015)? 
material and substantially rewritten 
the text to clarify and sharpen our 
arguments about the nature and 
relevance of the SRC. 
 
Our aim is not to prescribe how an SRC 
would operate in practice (eg how to 
determine a collective will or represent 
maginalised beneficiaries), or to 
prescribe any particular approach to 
governance, (such as to manage for 
resilience). Rather the method seeks 
to offer the criteria for assessing the 
extent to which governance structures 
in practice meet our ideal. 
 
We have revised the text to clarify this 
and avoid the impression given that we 
wish to prescribe the particular 
approaches that an SRC should take. 
  
 
"Promoting resilience" (abstract line 34, page 5 line 35, 
etc.) supports a normative reading of the concept of 
"resilience." While there is a multiplicity of interpretations 
of this problematic term (Brand and Jax 2008), resilience in 
the context of SESs is a non-normative property 
(Gunderson and Holling 2002); resilience is a description of 
the degree to which a system can withstand disturbance 
(both internal and external) and maintain a system of 
stabilising feedbacks. In terms of governance, an 
oppressive dictatorship can be resilient, as can a system of 
SES governance that promotes unbridled resource 
extraction, and marginalisation of a social wellbeing as 
long as the resource base and power structures will allow. 
Obviously such a trajectory is not sustainable, but it may 
be extremely resilient and require substantial disturbance 
to force regime shift. Given this context, I find that 
"promoting resilience" as a goal in and of itself, is difficult 
to swallow. 
 
As noted above, it was not our 
intention to promote a ͚resilienĐe͛ 
approach in this paper.  Rather the 
approach to be adopted should be 
determined through the SRC process. 
We have reworded the text to reflect 
this approach. 
List of "ecosystem" governance challenges on page 3: why 
are these not SES governance challenges? These all seem 
to have socio-economic and political aspects as important 
as the biophysical uncertainty surrounding them. 
 
Yes, this has been amended. 
Page 4, transition between Part 3 and Part 4 of  
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manuscript: a transitioning sentence or paragraph 
between the theoretical discussion of the SRC and the 
"cases" you explore in England (NPA, LP, NIA) would help 
the readability here. 
We have added a linking sentence at 
the start of Section 4. 
In addition, how did you justify choosing the three 
initiatives/organisations you chose to compare? What 
were your methods for analysing these examples? Without 
knowing how these examples were selected and the 
methods and breadth of information used to analyse  
them, the robustness of your conclusions cannot be 
assessed. Please address 
 
We have added discussion on this 
point. 
Page 13, lines 27-30: you discuss "authority and capacity" 
here, what about legitimacy? 
Our summary list of criteria inevitably 
cannot discuss all of the relevant 
issues.  For example, the SRC would 
need to take a broad view (Criterion 1) 
in order to have legitimacy. We would 
then assume that legitimacy would be 
a necessary precursor to authority and 
have not included this explicitly. 
Table 3: why not compare all three examples here (NPA, 
LP, NIA), why just NPA? However, I recognise the authors 
state that NPAs have the most advanced governance 
roles/responsibilities, it still may be a relevant comparison 
for the manuscript as a whole. 
 
A table of this sort for the other 2 
cases would have a large number of 
empty boxes given the narrower focus 
of the LPs and NIAs. 
Page 16, line 20: Again, this statement makes my question 
above related to your methods much more critical to 
address. 
 
We recognise this limit of the approach 
taken here. 
Page 20, line 12: "funding... guaranteed for a minimum of, 
say, five or six years"—based on what evidence? Why not 
10-12 years? This seems like an arbitrary suggestion. 
This reflects our experience with the 
analysis of partnerships in the UK but 
of course there is no clear number. The 
5 or 6 years is to emphasise something 
beyond the usual shorter terms while 
avoiding any open-ended commitment. 
The wording has been revised. 
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1 
2 
3 Highlights: 
4  Ideal governance may be conceptualised as delivered by a social residual claimant 
5  Governance proliferates institutions with no single agency having oversight 
6 
7  Partnerships are tasked to deliver public benefit not their own collective interest 
8  Short-termism undermines building social capital and long term planning 
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42 
43 
44 1.   The challenge of social-ecological systems governance 
45 
46 
Environmental resources are increasingly required to deliver complex mixes of both private and 
47 
48 public goods and services. Particular pressures articulate around the current and future use and 
49 management of rural land. Options for the delivery of agricultural outputs have traditionally been 
50 resolved within individual farm business decision-making.  But today, the wider social demands to 
52 meet biodiversity, climate, public access, energy, landscape and water management objectives, 
53 alongside the production of food and fibre, indicate the need for a broader, multi-actor and 
54 
55 pluridisciplinary, deliberative approach. This range of desired outputs is increasingly characterised in 
56 terms of the delivery of ecosystems services (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005; UK National 
57 Ecosystem Assessment, 2011; Schrӧter, et al., 2014) and so the promotion of a socially desirable 
58 
59 package of public and private goods through land use planning and management may be cast in 
60 terms of the appropriate governance of ecosystems. 
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1 Effective ecosystem governance in this context faces many major challenges. 
2 
3  Multiple stakeholders, at multiple scales (local, regional, national and international) value 
4 ecosystem goods and services differently, not simply in terms of relative valuations of 
5 particular items, but also in terms of the broader value systems which underpin their 
6 
7 preferences. 
8  The values of services generated within a particular locality depend on both the capacity of 
9 the local area to supply them, as well as on the character and scale of local and non-local 
11 demands for them. There is thus substantial spatial heterogeneity. 
12  There are trade-offs but also synergies and complementarities amongst ecosystems services; 
13 
14 not just between individual private and public goods, but also amongst alternative bundles 
15 of public and private goods. 
16  The land and/or the capacity to control and influence the delivery of ecosystems services is 
17 
18 usually in multiple and complex ownerships. 
19  Public policy towards individual ecosystem services tends to be implemented through 
20 
21 separate agencies, with limited co-ordination between them. 
22  The operation of certain key elements within ecosystems (e.g. climate regulation; biological 
23 adaptation) is only partially understood and subject to uncertainty and ignorance. 
24 
25 
26 This mix of challenges, which combines both ͚Ŷatural͛ and ͚human͛ elements1 together in a social- 
27 ecological system (SES) (Folke et al., 2005) requires land management at a scale larger than that of a 
28 
29 typical, individual farm business. But it is difficult to generalise about exactly how large this scale 
30 should be. Important interactions between elements within the system occur at all scales, ranging 
31 from those at micro-scale (e.g. between plant roots, fungal mycorrhizae and the soil), to those with 
33 much broader impacts (e.g. greenhouse gas emissions acting on global climate). However, 
34 discontinuities in the strength and nature of interactions can be identified and used to define certain 
35 
36 scales at which there is a greater degree of system-internalisation of impacts or outputs; thus, 
37 delimiting the SES in respect of these features. For example for hydrology, it might be represented 
38 by a catchment, whereas for landscape or ecology it could be some sort of ͚Ŷatural area͛ or relatively 
39 
40 homogeneous landscape unit. This is not to imply that ecosystems are always congruent with such 
41 ͚landscape-sĐale͛ places: rather, that in practice the formation of governance structures demands 
42 specific (usually spatial) delineations within which institutional rules may be defined and 
43 
44 implemented for SES planning and management. 
45 
46 
Beyond the question of scale, there is the need to establish an effective governance structure and 
48 modus operandi. We rarely have appropriate, established institutional structures through which 
49 values and options may be explored and shared, consensus determined and processes established 
50 
51 for the delivery of socially desired ecosystem management. Most existing governance structures lack 
52 capacity to identify and adequately represent the complex range of attributes and services that flow 
53 from rural land management in the long term. This problem has been recognised previously: 
54 
55 Lindberg and Fahlbeck (2011, p. 35) comment that there is ͞scope for new forms of institutional 
56 arrangements, or governance, to make better use of synergies and complementary inter-relations 
57 
58    
59 
1 
We use this dichotomy for the sake of simplicity in language, whilst acknowledging the scientific impossibility 
60 of defining boundaries between its poles. 
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between actors and activities͟. Erickson (2015) comments on the need for new institutions to 
1 improve the resilience of SESs. Lubell (2015, p. 44) argues that determining ͞which institutional 
2 
3 structures work best in different situations is one of the most important unresolved questions in the 
4 policy sciences͟. Chaffin et al. (2014) have argued for more research on the relationship between 
5 the principles of adaptive governance and those of ͚good͛ governance. Market based instruments 
6 
7 have potential roles, but they are incomplete and their outcomes uncertain (Lockie, 2013).  We also 
8 recognise that the required institutional arrangements will not simply reveal an existing set of 
9 shared values and preferences but rather they must be deliberative, acting to create these values. 
10 
11 Vatn (2005, p. 203) argues that ͞the core policy issue is to determine which institutional frameworks 
12 are most reasonable to apply to which kinds of problem͟. Choices reflect the norms, rules and 
13 expectations as reflected in the institutions of a society.  From this perspective, the sharing and 
15 development of a common view means that institutional arrangements for governance will shape 
16 both the values underpinning SES planning and management, and the specific management or 
17 
18 resource-allocation decisions that arise from them. 
19 
20 In this paper we explore approaches to the governance of SESs. Our method centres around the 
21 
22 perspective of an ͚ideal type͛; the social residual claimant (SRC). In recognising that there is no single 
23 organisation or forum that takes an overview of the workings, desired outcomes and wider 
24 implications of ecosystems, the SRC represents how the ͚owner͛ of an SES would act to maximise the 
25 
26 long term societal value arising from the provision of ecosystem services.  This enables the 
27 identification of criteria that need to be met in order to achieve this ideal. We then compare these 
28 criteria against three case studies of collective environmental governance in the UK.  This shows how 
30 these approaches to ecosystem governance differ from the SRC ideal and hence suggests directions 
31 for further research and development. 
32 
33 
34 2.   The relevance of the Social Residual Claimant 
35 
36 
37 Under most conditions of governance, multiple actors and stakeholders influence outcomes in a 
38 variety of ways through markets, institutional hierarchies and networks (e.g. Rhodes, 1999), and no 
39 single agent has a clear overall control. Chhotray and Stoker (2010 p. 3) see governance operating in 
40 
41 a context where ͞there are a plurality of actors or organisations and where no formal control system 
42 can dictate the terms of the relationships between these actors and organisations͟. This raises the 
43 question as to how in principle we can envisage ͚optimal͛ governance of an SES, as a standard 
45 against which to assess actual governance processes. It is certainly possible to conceive of a 
46 hypothetical single, benign ͚owner͛. Such an ͚owner͛ of an SES would act as an SRC (Hodge and 
47 
48 Adams, 2014).  As identified in economic theory, the residual claimant of an enterprise acts to 
49 maximize the residual that is left after all costs have been paid and revenues received, and hence 
50 maximise the net benefit gained, as judged by the claimant. Varian (1993 p.617) argues: ͞In order to 
51 
52 design an efficient incentive scheme it is necessary to ensure that the person who makes the effort 
53 decision is the residual claimant to the output͟.  The residual claimant also bears the residual risks 
54 after all exchanges have taken place. In a private company, the residual claimant receives the net 
55 
56 cash flows: the difference between the revenues received and the payments made (Fama and 
57 Jensen, 1983b).  However, the management of an SES bears more resemblance to a non-profit 
58 organisation, where there are no agents with alienable rights to residual net cash flows (Fama and 
60 Jensen, 1983a p. 318)and thus risks are borne by consumers or beneficiaries of that organisation͛s 
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activities, as well as by the factors used to produce the outputs (Fama and Jensen, 1983b).  Residual 
1 claims are vested in a board of trustees acting on behalf of the beneficiaries and net cash flows are 
2 
3 all committed to current and future output (Fama and Jensen, 1983b, p. 348).  Speckbacher (2008 p. 
4 305) comments that ͞residual rights of control include the right to interpret its mission and turn it 
5 into something more concrete by formulating organisational objectives, the right to specify how this 
6 
7 mission is best realized and the right to make all management decisions͟.  We thus see the SRC 
8 taking a role equivalent to the board of trustees of a non-profit organisation and acting for the 
9 collective interest of all stakeholders. Because the impacts of planning and managing rural land in 
10 
11 an SES include both market and non-market values, the residual claimant effectively acts as a 
12 societal agent, determining collective values and preferences, taking account of the full range of 
13 public and private impacts, and identifying and implementing appropriate management options. 
15 
16 We also need to identify the beneficiaries on whose behalf the trustees act. If we identify an SES 
17 
18 operating across a defined spatial area, then the beneficiaries or stakeholders are those people 
19 within that area whose welfare is affected by the operation of the SES. This is clearly only a subset 
20 of all of the people who are affected by the SES, as some may be outside the defined area. 
21 
22 However, for those physically present within the defined space, incentives will be established by 
23 external agencies and institutions in order to influence local actions that have wider consequences. 
24 In addition, our beneficiaries should also include those who can reasonably be expected to be 
25 
26 present in the future. 
27 
28 
This idea of the SRC aims to fill a missing element in the analysis of the governance of SESs.  In 
30 practice, the governance of an SES involves numerous sets of institutions operating with different 
31 types of agent and at different scales.  These are implemented by separate organisations targeting 
32 
33 narrow sets of ecosystem services, such as forestry, water quality, biodiversity or flood protection, 
34 perhaps with little consideration for the interactions with other ecosystem services or wider social 
35 impacts. Generic interventions, such as regulatory standards, imposed by higher levels of authority 
36 
37 will impact differently within different contexts at lower levels. These interventions operate and 
38 interact through social, economic and environmental relationships leading to particular local 
39 outcomes. They operate imperfectly, often with impacts that had not been planned and side effects 
40 
41 that had not been anticipated.  And some aspects of the operation of ecosystems that could have 
42 more beneficial local impacts will not be addressed by policy interventions at all. The SRC 
43 experiences the cumulative effects of these processes and impacts (both positive and negative) 
45 within a local area. It aims to attain, as a single idealised agent, the values that would emerge from 
46 a ͚perfectly͛ balanced decision-making process encompassing all stakeholders, taking a long-term 
47 
48 and perfectly informed viewpoint. 
49 
50 We are not proposing that such an organisation could exist in practice or that there ͚should͛ be a 
51 
52 single entity that encompasses all of these qualities. Our SRC is an ͚ideal type͛, an idealised version 
53 of a decision-making process which can serve as a benchmark against which to assess real-world 
54 governance structures. Coser (1977 p.223) defines Weďer͛s ideal type as an ͞analytical construct 
55 
56 that serves the investigator as a measuring rod to ascertain similarities as well as deviations in 
57 concrete cases͟.  It is not meant to be realistic or to represent a practical goal for policy, but it serves 
58 a useful purpose in providing a method by which to compare and assess alternative governance 
60 approaches. In practice, there is no single organisation or forum where a perspective exactly 
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equivalent to that of a SRC is taken. The implication of our approach is not that we should seek to 
1 create a single organisation but rather that governance systems should be developed in such a way 
2 
3 that the processes encapsulated in the SRC concept should be implemented, through which values 
4 and issues may be recognised, shared and deliberated taking account of the consequences, intended 
5 or incidental, of other governance arrangements.  The aim of these approaches might be to 
6 
7 maximise (in some sense) or optimise net social benefit or in the face of significant uncertainties 
8 they might seek to promote resilience through adaptive management (Folke, 2006). Our focus is 
9 therefore not on the concept of the SRC as a governance approach in its own right, but on the 
10 
11 various forms of governance structure that could meet similar criteria of operation, thereby enabling 
12 a community both to determine appropriate objectives and/or targets for ecosystem management, 
13 and to take actions in order to pursue them. 
15 
16 3.   Criteria for effective operation as a SRC 
17 
18 
19 For any coherent unit of rural land, governance outcomes emerge from the multiplicity of markets, 
20 hierarchies of state regulations and networks impacting on the actions of stakeholders within the 
21 
22 local area. Local actors will receive payment for marketed outputs.  Following the polluter pays and 
23 provider gets principles (Hodge, 2016), external costs (i.e. beyond the boundaries of the area) may 
24 be regulated or penalised and external benefits may be paid or rewarded. A parallel argument 
25 
26 applies to impacts from outside the area that are experienced within it. These will generally be 
27 implemented by governments and other actors beyond the area covered by the ecosystem, in 
28 polycentric governance systems (Ostrom, 2010). They require effective communication across scales 
30 (Vignola, et al., 2013). 
31 
32 
33 The significance of the SRC is that it assesses the net outcomes that arise from these combined 
34 operations within a locality. Given the degree of uncertainty surrounding SES behaviour, the 
35 outcomes that arise from these various interventions impacting within the local area will often be 
36 
37 different from those intended, or outcomes intended at one point in time will no longer represent 
38 those desired at some later date when available information or circumstances have changed.  This 
39 implies a need for an adaptive management approach (e.g. Lee, 1999); a need constantly to adjust 
40 
41 actions in pursuit of locally determined, probably shifting, objectives.  And if an SRC is to have the 
42 capacity to promote socially optimal objectives, it needs to be able to influence the ways in which 
43 SES resources are generated or fostered, used and managed. Because in the UK the land-based and 
45 human elements of SES are largely private, this process must be able to influence the actions of 
46 private agents. The means by which such influence is exerted have been set out, for instance, by 
47 
48 Brown and Everard (2015) and are not discussed here. Our focus is on the element missing in their 
49 framework concerning who has the oversight and authority to determine and implement the 
50 relevant suite of options across different sectors. 
51 
52 
53 The issue in question goes beyond the collective management of common property resources such 
54 as promoted by Ostrom (1990). As noted at the start, the SES is complex with multiple agents and 
55 
56 interests. The approach here is rather a form of co-management (Carlsson and Berkes, 2005) or 
57 adaptive governance (Plummer, et al., 2013). These two terms are often used synonymously 
58 (Chaffin, et al., 2014). As expressed by Lubell (2015, p. 42) ͞Actors must learn what types of policy 
60 solutions can provide mutually beneficial outcomes, cooperatively act together to implement the 
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agreed-upon policy solutions, and bargain over the distribution of costs and benefits͟. To this we 
1 might add the higher level questions of determining the constitutional arrangements under which 
2 
3 the collective choice decisions are made (Ostrom, 2005) and which will influence the level and 
4 incidence of benefits and costs of alternative choices. Any co-management organisation meeting 
5 the criteria for an SRC would have to engage in a range of planning, implementation, co-ordination 
6 
7 and monitoring activities. Lindberg and Fahlbeck (2011) found evidence of collective organisations 
8 becoming involved in these sorts of co-management activities in Sweden.  Schultze et al. (2015) 
9 provide case studies of three initiatives adopting adaptive governance. 
10 
11 
12 In considering how best to stimulate and support an effective SRC governance approach in any 
13 specific context, we can identify some potentially relevant guidance within Ostroŵ͛s (2005 p.259) 
15 design principles for robust common property institutions. However, as explained earlier, the 
16 context for the governance of an SES is one of co-management, rather than common property 
17 
18 management. Thus principally the SRC needs to: 
19 1.   Take account of the range of values of ecosystems services pertaining to a particular area 
20 (breadth of concern). This sets the context within which the SRC can determine trade-offs 
21 
22 between values. 
23 2.   Have sufficient spatial coverage to capture/internalise key systems linkages (spatial scale). 
24 This internalises the major values. 
25 
26 3.   Have means to effect changes in land and resource management either through authority to 
27 implement policy mechanisms or ability to act on its own behalf (authority and capacity to 
28 act). This enables the SRC to translate its objectives into practical actions on the ground. 
30 4.   Include representatives of and be accountable to local stakeholders (representativeness) so 
31 that the important values are represented internally within the SRC. This requires the SRC to 
32 
33 respect formal and informal institutions. 
34 5.   Be able to take the long view (e.g. via a low discount rate, or similar) so that the SRC will give 
35 due weight to values as they impact on current and future populations. 
36 
37 6.   Be subject to some degree of external regulation and audit (accountability). There should be 
38 some independent audit process to ensure that an organisation follows good practice. 
39 7.   Have a capacity to build social capital and active learning (deliberative decision making and 
40 
41 adaptive management). A culture of trust and reciprocity can facilitate the process of 
42 consensus-building, better reflecting stakeholder values and reducing transactions costs. 
43 Assuming imperfect knowledge of how land management affects the delivery of ES in an 
45 unpredictable SES, working with experts and practitioners can promote active learning and 
46 adaptive management. 
47 
48 
49 As can be seen, the criteria for effective SRC behaviour include some that are ͚statiĐ͛ or pre- 
50 determined and others that are dynamic, only developing over time as the governance structure 
51 
52 builds institutional and social capital and implements planning and management. Furthermore, as 
53 the scale and nature of SES elements vary between localities, it is to be expected that governance 
54 structures will similarly vary – institutional design will reflect the complexities and values of the 
55 
56 assets being managed and the potential gains to be had from alternative intensities of governance 
57 and the costs of implementing them. Nevertheless, it should be possible to analyse and interpret 
58 how a variety of different SES governance approaches match up against these criteria in practice. 
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4.   Governance structures in practice 
1 
2 
3 We explore the extent to which governance arrangements meet these criteria through case studies 
4 of current environmental management initiatives and institutions in the UK. Governance can be 
5 organised along sectoral or spatial lines. Predominantly central government is sectoral while local 
6 
7 government is territorial, with responsibilities for spatial planning and the provision of a range of 
8 local services. Central government departments are responsible for implementing legislation at a 
9 national (country within the UK) scale, and increasingly over the years subject to legislation and 
10 
11 policies adopted within the European Union and transposed into local regulations. While the 
12 approach and implications vary territorially, the values that are applied essentially arise from the 
13 way in which the legislation is initially written, interpreted and implemented through European 
15 institutions, UK Parliament and the judicial institutions. This establishes the context within which 
16 local areas operate. 
17 
18 
19 Members of local councils will in principle represent the values of the local community. But the 
20 competences of local government do not span the full range of rural land issues. In the UK, 
21 
22 territorial planning decisions are determined at a local level by local government authorities, subject 
23 to central government principles, guidance and appeals but local government has relatively little 
24 influence over the ways in which undeveloped land is used. In respect of hydrological processes 
25 
26 local authorities have a role in flood protection (working with the governŵeŶt͛s Environment 
27 Agency, in England), and in respect of recreation and landscape management, local authorities 
28 undertake maintenance and surveillance of rights of way and open access areas. 
 
30 
31 Notwithstanding this mix of functions invested in formal local government structures, the shift 
32 
33 towards working at a ͚landscape͛ or ecosystem scale over the past twenty years or so has spawned a 
34 variety of new approaches (Lawton et al., 2010; Benton, 2012; Helm, 2015). In particular, different 
35 initiatives have sought to establish local partnerships in England that bring together stakeholders 
36 
37 with shared interests in practical environmental management. A large number of initiatives have 
38 been funded by government and its agencies to stimulate partnership projects with the aim of 
39 promoting collective action across different areas of land and / or integration of interests across 
40 
41 different land use sectors or ecosystem services.  Some new partnerships have been established as 
42 new bodies, such as River Basin District Liaison Panels set up under the EU Water Framework 
43 Directive (Cook, et al., 2012) for integrated catchment management (Short, 2015), partnerships 
45 supporting the delivery of large scale conservation areas (Adams, et al., 2014; 2016) or farmer 
46 groups in the provision of environmental services (Jongeneel and Polman, 2014). A suite of 
47 
48 partnerships is the direct result of specific funding packages – as in the case of Heritage Lottery 
49 Landscape Partnerships, Payment for Ecosystem Services pilots and Nature Improvement Areas; 
50 whilst others have arisen through bottom-up empowerment processes, including non-statutory 
51 
52 arrangements such as ad hoc catchment groups (Benson, et al., 2013). 
53 
54 
These groups generally bring stakeholders together to consider interventions or initiatives to be 
55 
56 undertaken within a local area. The stakeholders may be from just two sectors, such as a group of 
57 landholders jointly entering into an agri-environment contract with a government agency (Franks 
58 and Emery, 2013), or from multiple sectors (wildlife and landscape protection, water quality, 
60 farming, forestry, public access, local community/quality of life) focusing on a particular issue, such 
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as water quality standards, or particular location, such as a National Park. Commonly, a major 
1 motivation behind partnership lies in the availability of funding such that the collective decisions to 
2 
3 be made relate to the particular projects to which funding should be allocated. Those involved thus 
4 have to negotiate a preferred plan and process for achieving a range of targets, as well as to oversee 
5 implementation of the plan and to monitor and report on achievements.  The extent to which they 
6 
7 participate genuinely in pursuit of the overall ͚common interest͛ or to which each partner acts in 
8 pursuit of its own individual or organisational interest will not always be evident.  Participation by 
9 these organisations is voluntary and they have little leverage to promote actions and none to coerce 
10 
11 actions. However, the source of funding holds authority over their ͚performanĐe͛ in the sense that 
12 funding could be withdrawn or reclaimed if the partnership fails to deliver against its plans. 
13 Partnerships do not have a democratic mandate, except indirectly through the involvement of 
15 stakeholders from elected bodies. Nonetheless, many have a strong participatory agenda through 
16 which the actions of the partnership are expected to be determined collectively and thus 
17 
18 ͚legitimised͛ ďy a wider public. For some such bodies, the scope of their interests tends to be limited 
19 and they will generally operate over a fixed time period; but for others, even in cases where funding 
20 is time-limited, the partnership will sustain itself through a variety of tactics including serial bidding 
21 
22 for funds and diversification of operational models. 
23 
24 
5.   Development of SES governance approaches in the UK 
25 
26 
27 In principle, we may envisage governance organisations for an SES operating at different scales, 
28 addressing different mixes of benefits and costs and representing the interests of different sets of 
30 agents. The larger the scale and the greater the number of agents operating within the area of 
31 governance and the wider the range of ecosystems services covered, then the stronger will be the 
32 
33 authority required to direct agents͛ actions and the more complex will be the challenge of reaching 
34 consensus. While an ͚ideal type͛ might apply these governance principles at relatively large scale 
35 across a broad set of ecosystem services, in practice we have not identified institutional structures 
36 
37 meeting these conditions. We can though identify emergent institutional structures that embody at 
38 least some of the elements of an ideal SES governance approach, but either at a smaller spatial scale 
39 or covering a restricted range of ecosystem services. 
40 
41 
42 In order to explore the extent to which these governance principles are applied in practice we 
43 consider the approaches adopted in three policy contexts in the UK.  A number of existing UK 
45 organisations and initiatives undertake aspects of these governance roles, including National Park 
46 Authorities; Nature Improvement Areas (NIAs); River Basin management planning under the Water 
47 
48 Framework Directive (e.g. Benson et al. 2013); Landscape Partnerships (funded by the Heritage 
49 Lottery Fund); Commons Associations and Agri-environment farmer groups. From these initiatives 
50 we have chosen to assess three contrasting examples against the proposed SRC criteria. These 
51 
52 represent programmes adopted across a significant number of cases at a national level and for 
53 which we have access to information on their organisation and approaches.  The initiatives require 
54 stakeholders with interests in different sectors to work together towards a common objective.  We 
55 
56 do not claim that they are representative of all initiatives and we would argue that similar analysis 
57 could be undertaken across other examples. A key aim here is to test whether the assessment of 
58 these environmental initiatives against the criteria identified for an SRC has the potential to identify 
60 particular strengths and limits of the approaches to governance represented by these programmes. 
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 National Parks in England Landscape Partnerships in 
UK 
Nature Improvement Areas 
in England 
Purpose Implementation and 
management of National 
Parks 
Landscape enhancement 
through Heritage Lottery 
funding 
Landscape- scale nature 
conservation 
History Established under National 
Parks and Access to 
Countryside Act 1949 
Implemented by Heritage 
Lottery Fund in 2003 
Implemented following 
Natural Environment White 
Paper (Defra, 2011) from 
2012 to 2015. 
Number of 
areas 
10 99 12 
Decision- 
making body 
National Park Authority Partnership Partnership 
Scope Natural beauty, wildlife and 
cultural heritage. Public 
understanding and 
enjoyment. Social and 
economic well-being of local 
community. 
Putting heritage 
conservation at the heart of 
rural and peri-urban 
regeneration. 
Joined up and resilient 
ecological networks at 
landscape scale 
Scale 300-2,300 km
2
 20-200 km
2
 100-500 km
2
 
Approximate 
total annual 
programme 
budget 
£50m £15m £2.5m 
Methods of 
influence 
Planning authority. 
Expenditure of central 
government grant. 
Partnerships 
Influence via allocating 
Heritage Lottery funds. 
Partnerships 
Influence via allocating 
Natural England funding. 
Partnerships 
 
60 
For the three selected initiatives – National Parks; Landscape Partnerships and NIAs, we pose the 
1 question: Does the governance arrangement effectively act as an SRC with regard to the SES in a 
2 
3 particular locality? This then enables a comparative analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of each 
4 by comparison with the ͚ideal͛ as represented by the criteria elaborated above. We set out some 
5 basic characteristics of the programmes from which the cases are drawn in Table 1 and then assess 
6 
7 each criterion in turn, for each of the 3 cases. The discussion is based on information available 
8 through websites, published evaluations and other literature and through the authors͛ personal 
9 experiences with these organisations. We have not undertaken interviews with the staff of the 
10 
11 organisations specifically to explore the issues raised here: that would be an issue for further 
12 research. 
13 
14 
15 
16 Table 1: Key characteristics of selected programmes 
17 
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29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
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39 
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58 CRITERION 1: Takes account of the range of values of ecosystems services pertaining to a particular 
59 area (breadth of concern) 
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1 A National Park Authority in England and Wales has engagements across a range of sectors: 
2 
3 agriculture, spatial planning, water quality, biodiversity, landscape, public access, economic 
4 development and housing. Under national legislation, National Parks have two main statutory 
5 purposes: 
6 
7 • To conserve and enhance the natural beauty, wildlife and cultural heritage of their areas. 
8 • To promote opportunities for the public understanding and enjoyment of the special 
9 qualities of their areas. 
10 
11 They also have a duty to seek to foster the social and economic well-being of local communities so 
12 that there is a requirement to balance national and local interests. Three categories of member are 
13 appointed to the National Park Authority: local authority members, parish members, and ͚Ŷational͛ 
15 members (appointed by the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs). Half plus 
16 one of the members of the Authority are appointed by local authorities and the remainder are 
17 
18 national members, of whom half less one are drawn from the parishes located in the Park. Defra 
19 (2010) emphasises that members have a primary duty to ensure that the Authority furthers 
20 statutory Park purposes and that they should regard themselves first and foremost as having a duty 
21 
22 to act in the best interest of the Authority and the Park. 
23 
24 
A Landscape Partnership (LP) is formed in order to protect, enhance and promote heritage within a 
25 
26 specific landscape. The Partnership should be ͚made up of a variety of local, regional and national 
27 organisations alongside the local community, who all have a shared purpose to develop, manage and 
28 deliver the scheme for the benefit of the landscape and the community as a whole͛ (Heritage Lottery 
30 Fund, 2013). This approach therefore assumes a mix of both national and local values within the 
31 governance structure (Clarke, 2015). For example, the Board of the Upper Nidderdale LP is chaired 
32 
33 by the Chair of the Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty Joint Advisory Committee or their nominee, 
34 and is made up of representatives from 20 local and regional organisations including parish councils, 
35 farmer and landowner groups, environmental agencies and NGOs. In the Lincolnshire Coastal 
36 
37 Grazing Marshes Partnership, the East Lindsey District Council, English Heritage, Environment 
38 Agency, Farming & Wildlife Advisory Group, Lincolnshire County Council, Lincolnshire Wildlife Trust, 
39 Lindsey Marsh Drainage Board, National Farmers Union and Natural England are the regular 
40 
41 members of the partnership, while meetings are also attended by local parish representatives and 
42 local landowners. 
43 
44 
45 Nature Improvement Areas (NIAs) have been run by partnerships of local authorities, local 
46 communities and landowners, the private sector and conservation organisations. 12 pilot NIAs were 
47 
48 funded over 3 years from 2012. In its guidance for local stakeholder bodies on determining 
49 appropriate places for local NIAs, Defra (2012) states ͚an NIA should be made on a partnership basis, 
50 with the local groups or individuals who have developed the NIA and the farmers and landowners 
51 
52 concerned͛; but the 12 pilots ͚will try out different approaches, and the variety of objectives, issues 
53 and partnerships seen across the NIAs is part of this purpose͛ (Collingwood Environmental Planning, 
54 2013). 10 out of the 12 (83%) partnerships existed prior to the NIA initiative, with a mixture of 
55 
56 formal (6) and informal (4) partnership arrangements. All NIAs were required to have memorandums 
57 of agreement as part of the formal funding procedure. Most NIAs had between 10 and 15 partners, 
58 though one NIA had 54 partners (Birmingham and Black Country), while Marlborough Downs was led 
60 by a group of farmers with only two other partners. Environment Agency, Natural England and 
61 
62 
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Forestry Commission (all government agencies) were frequent partnership members, while 8 NIAs 
1 had private sector corporate partners and 10 included the National Farmers Union and/or Country 
2 
3 Land and Business Association as a partner. 10 also included the Royal Society for the Protection of 
4 Birds (RSPB) and 5 had a local university or college as a partner. 
5 
6 
7 Comparing these 3 types: National Parks have an explicit remit across the range of ecosystem 
8 services, even though they are not the agency primarily responsible for them. The NPA members 
9 are predominantly drawn from the local community. While they will thus have a clear view of local 
10 
11 considerations they are tasked to act in the interests of the National Park, and that implies a 
12 ͚national͛ perspective of priorities. Partners in LPs and NIAs may be involved either in a personal 
13 capacity or else as representatives of wider organisations that might be a governmental body, such 
15 as a parish council, an NGO, such as a conservation organisation, or a private company, such as a 
16 water company. There is a different mix of interests represented amongst the different initiatives, 
17 
18 and no obvious rationale for this in terms of the impacts of the projects in local areas.  Rather, 
19 membership is likely to reflect initiatives taken by particular leading individuals and their willingness 
20 and capacity to bring resources to the collective endeavour. The focus of the LP and NIA initiatives is 
21 
22 narrower than that of National Parks, although a variety different sectoral organisations are, 
23 unevenly, engaged in the partnerships. Partners may have an interest in seeking to influence 
24 decisions in favour of their personal or their organisation͛s interests but their organisation might 
25 
26 also be involved because it can bring expertise or resources to the partnership, such as a local 
27 university.  . 
28 
29 
30 CRITERION 2: Have sufficient spatial coverage to capture/internalise key systems linkages (spatial 
31 scale) 
32 
33 
34 NPs have some match with England͛s defined National Character Areas (NCAs), which reflect 
35 relatively homogeneous territories in terms of their geology, biodiversity and land use, but they are 
36 
37 not necessarily homogeneous or consolidated (e.g. we might contrast Dartmoor National Park that 
38 coincides very closely with the Dartmoor NCA, with the Peak District National Park which broadly 
39 covers three different, neighbouring NCAs). In addition, in most cases the boundaries of NPs have 
40 
41 been deliberately designed to avoid urban settlements
2
. This might imply that NPs could be prone to 
42 under-recognition of local socio-economic linkages as well as of some ecosystem services (e.g. 
43 water/flooding, climate regulation). 
45 
46 LPs must cover an area of land that has a distinctive landscape character, recognised and valued by 
47 
48 local people; identifying what makes the landscape unique and identifiable, and what gives it its 
49 sense of place.  The emphasis on visual coherence may lead to under-recognition of broader linkages 
50 but that is not immediately evident from among the current funded LPs. There is no attempt to 
51 
52 exclude settlements, and areas have tended to be fairly consolidated, though also fairly 
53 heterogeneous. 
54 
55 
56 NIAs were large (in terms of nature conservation in the UK), discrete areas that, by taking a 
57 landscape–scale approach, ͚will deliver a step change in nature conservation, where a local 
58 
59    
60 
2 
the major exception being the South Downs National Park which includes a population of over 100,000. 
62 
63 
64 
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partnership has a shared vision for their natural environment͛ (Natural England, 2012). The 
1 partnership was charged with planning and delivering significant improvements for wildlife and 
2 
3 people through the sustainable use of natural resources: restoring and creating wildlife habitats, 
4 connecting local sites and joining up local action. Under its funding conditions, the partnership had 
5 to demonstrate measurable improvements – representing the ͚step change͛ - and take action to 
6 
7 promote and publicise its achievements widely at both local and national levels. The concept of NIAs 
8 clearly implies greater homogeneity than that for LP areas, but in practice, the 12 projects included 
9 several areas which demonstrate a high degree of variability in landscape types and biodiversity 
10 
11 challenges within their boundaries. 
12 
13 
CRITERION 3: Have means to effect changes in land and resource management either through 
15 authority to implement policy mechanisms or ability to act on its own behalf (authority and capacity 
16 to act) 
17 
18 
19 All these areas are subject to national regulations and policies. Particularly, they operate under the 
20 requirements of the Common Agricultural Policy and are subject to (predominantly European) 
21 
22 environmental regulations (Birds, Habitats, Water Framework, Floods, Nitrates, etc.).  In the cases 
23 that we are looking at, only the NP takes a statutory role, acting as the local planning authority with 
24 the ability to control built development within its area. In most other instances, organisations have 
25 
26 to operate within the constraints set by other agencies of central government and local authorities. 
27 The NPs have the most wide ranging roles as illustrated in Table 2. 
28 
29 
30 Table 2: Governance roles within National Parks 
31 Direct control Influence External controls and influence 
32 Land use NP management plan Central government guidance 
33 
34 Agriculture Influence over Rural 
35 Development 
36 Programme (RDP) 
37 uptake 
38 
CAP direct payments 
Rural Development Programme 
39 spatial planning Planning authority Central government guidance 
40 and appeal) 
41 water quality Partnerships Environment Agency 
42 (st EU rules) 
43 
44 Biodiversity Partnerships Natural England 
45 (st UK and EU rules) 
46 Landscape Indirect via RDP uptake 
47 and Planning control 48 
49 public access Recreation management 
50 Access agreements 
Legal access rights 
51 economic 
52 development 53 
Partnerships Local Enterprise Partnerships 
activities 
54 Housing Influence as planning 
55 authority 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
Department for Communities 
and Local Government 
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For LPs, their authority to act depends critically upon membership of the partnership itself, and its 
1 relationships with pre-existing authorities and agencies. Many LPs are led by a local authority so, in 
2 
3 that sense, have some parallels with NPAs; however, where central government agencies 
4 (represented by local officers) are signed up as members of the partnership (as they often are), 
5 there can be more direct linkage with their specific areas of authority. For both these bodies, a 
6 
7 notable area of relatively limited authority to act will be in respect of land management (beyond the 
8 boundaries of some very small areas of land which an NPA may actually own), unless farmers/other 
9 landowners form a part of the LP. However, both may use their resources to enter into contractual 
10 
11 agreements with farmers/landowners to help deliver their goals. 
12 
13 
NPAs were pioneers of local agri-environment schemes and, whilst these are now largely reduced in 
15 scale and scope, they still have resources for some initiatives with farmers. LPs may design and 
16 operate management contracts with local farmers and landowners. And indeed, the farmer- 
17 
18 members of some LPs will play an important role in designing these approaches. An LP may make 
19 payments to private owners for activities that contribute to achieving outcomes for heritage, people 
20 or communities using a third-party agreement. These agreements define the outcomes to be 
21 
22 delivered on private land and secure the management and maintenance of capital works from the 
23 expected date of the works͛ Đompletion, until 10 years after the project͛s completion (Heritage 
24 Lottery Fund, 2013). 
25 
26 
27 Given the variety of models of NIA partnership, their influence on land management will vary 
28 considerably between the different areas. For many, the situation is likely to be similar to that for 
30 LPs, in that they are led by public bodies and their ability to influence private landowners and 
31 managers depends upon how far these groups are drawn into the partnership or have agreed to 
32 
33 certain activities as part of the development of the NIA͛s goals and plans. In the specific case of 
34 Marlborough Downs NIA (MDNIA) the situation is almost the inverse, in that this is the sole farmer- 
35 led governance institution, whereby a group of 40 farmers has become a trust in order to receive 
36 
37 and manage the NIA funds. In this sense, the MDNIA has authority to act on all the land owned 
38 and/or managed by the trust members and it may have less ability to act directly in respect of 
39 meeting the responsibilities of statutory agencies or local authorities. 
40 
41 
42 But overwhelmingly in these examples, actions are based on voluntary agreements.  This is the case 
43 even for NPAs whose work is substantially delivered through partnerships with like-minded 
45 organisations or through leverage over financial incentives from third parties. 
46 
47 
48 CRITERION 4: Include representatives of and be accountable to local stakeholders 
49 (representativeness) 
50 
51 
52 NPA members are appointed to combine local and national knowledge and interest and, as noted 
53 above, to work ͚iŶ the best interests of the National Park͛. The SRC implies a local collective ͚self͛ 
54 interest with national interests addressed by higher levels of government providing incentives 
55 
56 (funding, regulations, encouragement/ guidance) to influence actions with wider consequences.  In 
57 NPAs there is an element of direct and formal representation through members͛ links to the 
58 government bodies by whom they are appointed but with explicit guidance that they should act in 
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the higher interests of the NP, which may well often not be the same as their local collective 
1 interest. 
2 
3 
4 Representation on LPs should be relatively open reflecting the range of stakeholders involved. That 
5 on NIAs is highly variable and likely to be narrower due to the narrower range of objectives covered. 
6 
7 In practice, involvement of stakeholders as partners in the LPs and NIAs will depend substantially on 
8 their active engagement and their capacity to contribute positively towards the likelihood of 
9 successfully securing the project funding in the first place, before the partnership has been formally 
10 
11 established. The main way in which an element of local accountability is pursued, in these 
12 structures, is through the strong focus in both programmes upon participatory approaches which 
13 involve the local community as a key element in how they undertake their activities; and upon 
15 communication with local and national stakeholders to inform them about these activities and their 
16 outcomes. 
17 
18 
19 CRITERION 5: Able to take the long view (i.e. low discount rate, or similar) 
20 
21 
22 NPAs are subject to short term political influences and funding arrangements; reductions in central 
23 government funding have forced them to cut back on a range of initiatives and reorient their efforts 
24 towards other sources of funding (Campaign for National Parks, 2015), although expenditure has 
25 
26 subsequently been protected in the Government͛s 2015 Autumn Statement. However they have an 
27 identity and core role which is likely to persist over a substantial period of time. The majority of NPs 
28 in England and Wales were designated in the 1950s. LPs are by definition time-limited and must 
30 focus upon delivery within a maximum period of 10-20 years. However, as with all funded initiatives 
31 they are supposed to plan for legacy beyond that point. NIAs have clearly the most transitory 
32 
33 lifespan, with only 3 years͛ funding and it is evident from the monitoring and evaluation so far that 
34 this challenges their ability to plan for the long term. In the second year evaluation report, the 
35 consultants (Collingwood Environmental Planning, 2014) note that of the 12 funded NIAs, only 5 had 
36 
37 specific plans to seek to continue their work beyond the 3 year funding period. Institutional 
38 structures will not be sustained in the absence of some resource base or long term funding stream. 
39 
40 
41 CRITERION 6: Be subject to some degree of external regulation and audit (accountability). 
42 
43 
All the institutional structures under consideration here are subject to some degree of external 
45 regulation and audit, in that they have to demonstrate financial probity in the conduct of their 
46 duties. However, whilst the provision made in these terms for LPs and NIAs is in the form of a simple 
47 
48 contract with conditions which must be capable of being evidenced upon demand and at regular 
49 intervals over the lifetime of the initiative, NPAs have more sophisticated regulatory and audit 
50 processes. The National Park Management Plan is a comprehensive public document intended to 
51 
52 serve as a yardstick against which NPA performance can be assessed. In addition, the process by 
53 which NPA budgets are determined requires them to evidence their work in a rolling programme of 
54 reporting and development. Finally, as with all public-funded ͚perŵanent͛ institutions, NPAs may 
55 
56 periodically be subject to scrutiny by the National Audit Office and may be the focus of attention or 
57 scrutiny by various Parliamentary Committees. 
58 
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CRITERION 7 : Have a capacity to build social capital and active learning. (deliberative decision 
1 making and adaptive management). 
2 
3 
4 This aspect of governance is much harder to identify and assess from outside of an organisation. It 
5 has been underplayed in NPAs in the past but more recently many NPAs have become engaged in 
6 
7 partnerships with a diversity of government, private and community actors (Lockwood, 2010). Clark 
8 and Clarke (2011) provide examples of NPAs working as a collective endeavour building trust and 
9 new capacities between individuals at different organisational levels and geographic scales.  LPs are 
10 
11 expected to include this as part of their modus operandi but evidence suggests that levels of 
12 engagement and active learning vary considerably between different cases. The same is apparent of 
13 NIAs. Evaluators are very positive about achievements, outreach, community involvement etc. in 
15 respect of both LPs and NIAs, but there is clearly scope for more research here. 
16 
17 
18 6.   Conclusions 
19 
20 The idea of an SRC sets an ideal against which particular governance arrangements may be assessed. 
21 
22 It is not intended to offer a template for governance but rather to point to the process whereby 
23 governance may address the complex factors interacting in unique and largely unpredictable ways 
24 within particular localities. It responds to the outcomes of the multitude of governance processes 
25 
26 that have impacts within their particular local area, as well as identifying gaps where governance is 
27 inadequate.  Governance needs to establish local community values and preferences, to identify and 
28 assess impacts, to make judgements about trade-offs and to identify and implement actions. This 
30 will be a deliberative approach.  It might in principle be implemented through a single organisation, 
31 through organisations working in parallel, or through some sort of deliberative forum. More work is 
32 
33 required in order to flesh out the options and their relative merits. The details of local arrangements 
34 will depend on local conditions and will vary greatly depending on such factors as the state of 
35 development, the wider significance of natural capital within the local area and the extent to which 
36 
37 the area is impacted by external forces. But the essential principles will remain the same. The ideal 
38 of an SRC offers a checklist of criteria against which existing arrangements may be compared. This 
39 presents a methodology that can have quite general applicability across different institutional 
40 
41 contexts. We have tested it in a relatively simple way in this paper in a UK context but argue that 
42 the approach can be equally applicable elsewhere. We have been able to assess the position with 
43 regard to many of the criteria.  However some aspects, particularly relating to the internal workings 
45 of partnerships, would require more in-depth analysis. 
46 
47 
48 NPAs meet a number of the criteria to act as an SRC. They develop management plans with broad 
49 scope and have concerns for a range of ecosystem services. They have statutory authority and 
50 indirect democratic representation. They have in many cases been in existence for over 50 years 
51 
52 and have a long term commitment to their area. There is a reasonable coherence to the areas 
53 designated as an NP, although the boundaries do not necessarily match ecosystem logic and the 
54 exclusion of major settlements may underplay the interactions between urban and rural areas. The 
55 
56 major departure from the criteria for an SRC is that the remit of the NPA is to advance the statutory 
57 national role of the Park rather than the particular interests of local stakeholders.  NPA members 
58 have to balance national and local perspectives but the lack of direct land ownership and the 
60 reliance on national funding and incentives weight actions towards the national orientation.  The 
61 
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members clearly may face conflicts of interest.  This means that the accountability of the NPA tends 
1 to be upwards to national government departments rather than from below via the local 
2 
3 community. This may challenge the trust given to it by the local community if it is seen as 
4 responding to national policy rather than to local interests.  In addition, its role as the SRC is 
5 constrained by the limited resources available to it and its lack of direct influence over agriculture, 
6 
7 environment, biodiversity, pollution and economic development. 
8 
9 
LPs and NIAs represent a more locally oriented approach, and they are directed towards the delivery 
10 
11 of a narrower range of ecosystem services that generally have less national significance than some 
12 aspects of NPs. They are also less formally established and are implemented through a variety of 
13 stakeholder involvements. There is no systematic representation of all stakeholder interests, rather 
15 engagement is determined on a more ad hoc basis. The approach relies upon funding to motivate 
16 change voluntarily, so it lacks the element of authority to regulate which NPs have in at least some 
17 
18 aspects of their work.  The arrangements in LPs and NIAs are essentially temporary, especially so in 
19 the case of the NIAs, and this challenges their capacity to take on long term commitments.  Rather, 
20 there will inevitably be pressure to achieve demonstrable change in the short term in order to justify 
21 
22 funding received and as a basis for applications to secure funding in the future. This parallels a 
23 general trend in neoliberal approaches towards governance that increasingly allocate resources 
24 through a series of separate projects (Sjöblom et al. 2012). 
25 
26 
27 On the other hand, it is possible that the objective to support provision of a narrower range to 
28 ecosystem services may mean that stakeholders hold a greater shared interest in the goals of the 
30 organisation. There may be a greater degree of self interest amongst partners who have joined in 
31 order to pursue their own aims. The extent to which this is achieved in practice will depend 
32 
33 considerably on the particular activities and composition of the membership. 
34 
35 Perhaps the most striking aspect of the organisations considered as putative SRCs is the uncertainty 
36 
37 surrounding the objectives that they are expected to adopt in decision making. NPA members are 
38 expected to make decisions that ensure that the Authority furthers statutory Park purposes. This is 
39 clearly not the same as furthering their own collective interest. The position is less clear for the LPs 
40 
41 and NIAs. They are funded in order to support the provision of public goods, and the aspiration on 
42 the part of funders would be that they should allocate the funds so as to maximise the wider social 
43 benefits of their actions; that is to say the value as perceived by stakeholders who are largely 
45 external to the organisation. But in practice, in all these examples the members of the organisation 
46 will need to balance the social aims of the organisation with their own private interests. In a world 
47 
48 of high degrees of uncertainty and asymmetric information it will be difficult for an external audit to 
49 determine precisely how or where that balance is being struck. This contrasts with our conceptual 
50 SRC where we posit that the SRC pursues its own collective ͚self͛ iŶterest rather than taking on a 
51 
52 wider social duty.  This is much closer to the position of the board of a public company that acts on 
53 behalf of a defined group of shareholders. However, even in this context, arguments are made that 
54 the board should also take account of wider issues through a policy of corporate social responsibility 
55 
56 (CSR). There is then debate as to whether corporate CSR represents self-interest by other means or a 
57 genuine attempt to redistribute the benefits of the activity to a wider population (Crifo and Forget, 
58 2015; Schmitz and Schrader, 2015). 
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Given its wider responsibility, more formal establishment, statutory basis and longer term 
1 commitment, the NPA comes closest to our ideal model of an SRC. But it could still be modified to 
2 
3 bring it closer to that ideal. As the SRC, the NPA members would in principle have the objective of 
4 taking decisions in the interests of stakeholders within the locality, now and in the future, rather 
5 than in the wider national interest. In this context, it would be more appropriate for members to be 
6 directly elected from the local community
3
.  External stakeholders, primarily national government, 
8 would then have to create explicit incentives to influence relevant decisions taken within the Park 
9 towards national interests. The NPA could then be granted greater discretion to act in pursuit of its 
10 
11 objectives. It is possible to envisage a position where at least an element of agricultural or economic 
12 development funding was allocated directly to NPAs. The NPA could be given devolved powers to 
13 allocate funding from the Common Agricultural Policy or lead a Local Enterprise Partnership which 
15 accesses government funds in support of economic development. It might take on the powers 
16 currently exercised by Natural England over the management of conservation sites within its 
17 
18 territory, subject to meeting nationally defined standards and criteria. It could play a role as an 
19 intermediary in establishing schemes for payments for ecosystems services. There would be some 
20 scope for raising funds either through voluntary donations or perhaps through local taxation, such as 
21 
22 on visitor stays.  In fact, NPs are already addressing these sorts of issues in the face of limits imposed 
23 on their public funding. 
24 
25 
26 Partnership and collective decision making are increasingly central to the governance of the 
27 countryside (Hodge, 2016), but the many examples in the UK tend to be sporadic, ad hoc, narrowly 
28 focussed on subsets of ecosystem services and time limited. The incentives facing decision makers 
30 are often unclear and interventions are voluntary and incentivised through the potential availability 
31 of grants. The involvement of local members of the various organisations contributes in terms of 
32 
33 introducing local information into decision making processes, but where the members are expected 
34 to pursue nationally set objectives, it leaves incentives for decision making unclear.  Our SRC ͚ideal͛ 
35 addresses the requirements for SES governance of wide and integrated concerns for the delivery of 
36 
37 ecosystem services, flexible and adaptive management and long term commitment.  Existing 
38 governance structures such as those examined in this paper fall far short of that ideal.  More work is 
39 required in order to explore further the conceptual issues, to understand better the existing 
40 
41 alternative and experimental structures of collective governance, and to design new institutions that 
42 can align incentives, commitment and capability. 
43 
44 
45 In considering the policy framework for appropriate institutions, the experience of LPs and NIAs 
46 suggests that short-termism poses a significant obstacle to achieving SRC-style arrangements and 
47 
48 outcomes. This issue becomes particularly acute in periods of low and/or reducing public funding, as 
49 it will reduce the resilience of the structures concerned and thus be likely to reduce their potential 
50 to make a difference, for the long term. Short-term creation and review of multi-actor and multi- 
51 
52 objective structures frequently entail significant transactions costs which may weigh heavily upon 
53 the performance of the initiatives, reducing their capacity to generate net benefits. These costs 
54 frequently fall upon the members of a partnership in advance of securing funds to achieve their 
55 
56 aims, as well as afterwards, thus weakening the ability of these institutions to be truly inclusive (as 
57 
58    
59 
3 
A bill to provide for direct elections to National Parks Authorities on a pilot basis failed to get through 
60 Parliament in 2014. 
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partners must have the capacity to dedicate resources to the initiative before any significant public 
1 support is forthcoming). Finally, the transactions costs which accrue to the funding bodies that hold 
2 
3 responsibility for assessing, awarding funding, tracking progress and policing performance may 
4 ultimately prove a disincentive to them continuing to adopt these kinds of approach, particularly if 
5 short-term evaluations are unable convincingly to demonstrate added value (which may be elusive 
6 
7 when there is only three years in which to operate, given the capacity-building usually associated 
8 with multi-actor adaptive management processes). For all these reasons, we suggest that policy 
9 makers need to devote more attention to medium-term institution building for SRC outcomes, 
10 
11 where structures and funding are guaranteed in excess of the typical periods currently, of perhaps 
12 five or six years, and to demonstrate some commitment to continuation subject to satisfactory 
13 performance beyond that point, rather than to operate within the normal three-yearly budgetary 
15 planning cycle for public finances. 
16 
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